This project was commissioned by the National Preparedness Commission (NPC). It was led by Dame Sara Khan with support from Crest Insights, to research the extent to which the UK’s social contract has weakened and what this means for national preparedness and crisis response. It builds on both Dame Sara Khan’s 2024 Independent Review of Social Cohesion and Resilience, and Crest Insight’s 2024 report Societal Threats and Declining Democratic Resilience: The New Extremism Landscape.​

​

What did we look at? 

​

The project comprised three phases: 

​

• Evidence review 

• Expert interviews

• Expert roundtables 

 

Evidence review

​

The evidence review examined existing research and evidence on trust, democratic resilience and social cohesion in the UK, examining trends over time, drivers of decline, and variation across demographic groups and regions. The following questions are addressed: 

​

1. To what extent has the social contract frayed? 

2. What opportunities does this present for extremists, hostile foreign actors and bad-faith actors?

3. What are the existing frameworks, strategies and policies to support resilience and national preparedness? 

4. What would this mean for government response to a local, regional or national emergency?

5. What can be done to strengthen national resilience and preparedness?

​

Interviews 

​

Twelve semi-structured interviews with experts in crisis planning, policing, resilience and national security complemented the evidence review. These interviews explored perceptions of the state of the social contract, social cohesion, and democratic resilience in the UK; and the opportunities this presents for extremists, bad-faith actors and hostile foreign actors to exploit crises; trends over time; protective factors; and examples of international best practice. Interviews also contributed to the development of plausible crisis scenarios to be tested in the roundtables. 

 

Roundtables 

 

Two expert roundtables were held in May 2026 to validate findings, refine the scenarios and develop recommendations. The first focused on scenario development and impact assessment. It brought together crisis planners, resilience experts, behavioural scientists and extremism experts to consider how the fraying social contract could affect the UK in different types of scenarios (see Section 3). The second roundtable focused on solutions, examining best practice from the UK and internationally and identifying practical ways to integrate democratic resilience and social cohesion into national preparedness arrangements. 

Together, these three phases informed the analysis, findings and recommendations set out in this report. 

​​

What did we find? 

​

A strong social contract — the relationship between citizens and their government — is fundamental to national resilience, underpinning social cohesion, democratic resilience and the ability of the United Kingdom to respond effectively to crises. 

​

Indicators of social cohesion and democratic resilience suggest that the social contract in the United Kingdom is fraying. Evidence includes increasing distrust in politicians, government and public services, growing concerns about the state of democracy and declining levels of democratic participation. This fraying is also reflected in weaker attachment to a national identity, high levels of social division affecting minority communities, driven by perspectives on immigration, and a widely held belief that politicians do not do enough to facilitate integration and cohesion.

​

The fraying of the social contract is largely driven by economic inequality, the harmful impact of digital spaces and global political instability. Reliance on digital spaces, including social media, for social engagement reduces in-person interaction and connects people with extreme and polarising views in a largely unregulated environment — only recently has the Online Safety Act been introduced to tackle this. Specific events, especially those which encourage a moral or emotional response, can act as flashpoints, raising concerns and making underlying tensions suddenly more visible.

​

Some aspects of the social contract remain strong. There is support for the principles of our democracy, perceptions of fair elections, strong trust in local communities, pride in Britain’s cultural contributions, and reasonably high levels of civic engagement, notably in times of crisis — for example, increased volunteering during the Covid-19 pandemic. Even so, there is a clear and immediate need to respond to weakening social cohesion and democratic resilience, particularly when considering the need to improve our preparedness for emergencies and crises — the subject of this report.

​

The fraying of the social contract presents extremists, hostile foreign actors and bad-faith actors with opportunities to further undermine public trust and confidence in democracy and democratic institutions. Malign actors view the social contract as another form of critical national infrastructure that can be easily targeted. The aftermath of the Southport stabbings in 2024 demonstrates the ability of these actors to capitalise on social division and harmful narratives against democracy.

​

Malign actors exploit the fraying social contract by using digital spaces and traditional media to generate and amplify false and harmful content to sow further division, deepen mistrust and undermine democracy. They are exploiting emergencies and crises to pursue their long-term goals. This was evident in Poland in September 2024 when severe flooding across southwestern Poland triggered a 300 per cent increase in misinformation and disinformation. This is concerning as it means that there was a wide range of false or misleading information circulating at the time of the crisis, competing with crisis management plans, which tend to be based on the assumption that the public will listen to and believe the authorities and will respond positively and appropriately to their advice.

 

The role of misinformation and disinformation creates unpredictability during times of crisis. This presents immediate and chronic risks that could contribute to the further fraying of the social contract. 

​

To address this challenge, the government must broaden its view of preparedness to include social cohesion and democratic resilience. It is unclear whether the government has put sufficient weight on actions to prepare for, respond to, and recover from crises with social cohesion and democratic resilience in mind. Social cohesion and democratic resilience must be integrated into preparedness and crisis planning at a government level and within Local Resilience Forums (LRF), with clear ownership and responsibility — this includes building our understanding of tension hotspots in our communities and how these are exploited by actors in times of crisis. 

 

Recommendation 1: Social cohesion and democratic resilience must be viewed as essential components of national resilience and preparedness to address the ongoing threat from malign actors seeking to exploit vulnerabilities through misinformation and disinformation.

 

Recommendation 2: Building and maintaining social cohesion and democratic resilience requires sustained cross-departmental commitment and investment, not only as a key consideration in preparation for crises, but as part of our national infrastructure — essential to the functioning of our society.

 

Recommendation 3: The government should establish a more systematic approach to understanding where and how crises could create opportunities for social division, disorder, and democratic harm.

 

We must tackle this threat with technology. Technology enables the creation and spread of misinformation and disinformation but it also represents a key tool for countering it. The government and key institutions, such as the BBC, need to be able to recognise, challenge and, where necessary, remove harmful content during crises — including that of bad-faith actors who currently largely fall outside of legislation. We must also be aware of the threat across media domains, including deepfakes, chatbots, private messaging and traditional media, tailoring our response accordingly. 

​

Recommendation 4: The government should invest in digital technological capabilities to identify emerging threats, detect problematic content at scale and support crisis response and communications.

 

There are gaps in the extent to which misinformation and disinformation can be adequately addressed through existing extremism, foreign interference and online harms frameworks. The spreading of misinformation and disinformation during a crisis has the potential to make unfolding emergencies worse and cause physical and emotional harm. Current legislation, including the National Security Act and Online Safety Act, is not designed to address the cumulative, fast-moving effects of UK-user amplified misinformation and disinformation in real-time. Similarly, the Public Order Act has no applicability for the negligent or good-faith spreading of misinformation. As such, there may be opportunities to close these legislative gaps and ensure that the actions of malign actors are addressed, while acknowledging the degree of severity and intentionality. 

 

Recommendation 5: The government should review how to update existing legal frameworks to appropriately address misinformation and disinformation during crises.

The social contract is two-way, and the public must have a defined role during crises — individual responsibility and citizenship are core to preparedness. Drawing on whole-of-society preparedness models from countries including Finland, Sweden and New Zealand, the public must be made more aware of the significant threat posed by misinformation and disinformation and their own responsibilities at times of crisis. This includes funding media literacy and broader critical thinking education to prepare individuals and communities for various crisis scenarios. Members of the public must be clear not only on the role of the government in preparing, responding and recovering from crises, but also on the importance of their own role. 

 

Recommendation 6: The government should devise and promote a whole-of-society approach that involves individuals, schools, businesses, and public institutions in strengthening resilience.

In times of crisis, we must use the assets at our disposal to be more effective communicators and counter misinformation and disinformation by malign actors. While there are established government responses in emergencies, for example, through the Civil Contingencies Act, erosion of the social contract means that the public does not always trust messaging from authorities. Alongside government messaging, the government should identify and maintain connections with trusted voices who can communicate effectively with different communities in crises.

 

Recommendation 7: The government should consider how journalism and public service broadcasting, including reporting on local democracy, are bolstered, with clear roles in challenging misinformation and disinformation, particularly in times of crisis. 

 

Recommendation 8: The government should ensure media platforms and Local Resilience Forums have comprehensive crisis communication protocols to counter misinformation and disinformation. These protocols should be underpinned by strong, ongoing relationships with community groups, the voluntary sector, and wider civil society, which should be developed and sustained as part of routine preparedness and resilience activities. 

 

Recommendation 9: Communication should explicitly acknowledge the likelihood of misinformation and disinformation being spread in crises and provide the public with practical advice and access to trusted information sources.

 

Crises present an opportunity to learn and improve our response to crises and malign actors and resist further fraying of the social contract. Crises will happen and malign actors will seek to take advantage of these moments. Faced with this reality, we must continue to focus on building and investing in social cohesion and democratic resilience, including supporting communities and taking lessons forward into future planning.  

 

Recommendation 10: We should use crises and emergencies as an opportunity to rebuild the social contract and trust in democratic institutions in the affected areas and more widely.

Recommendation 11: Following crises, the government, led by the central directorate/Cabinet Office and working with relevant partners, including LRFs, should consistently undertake a review of the role that misinformation and disinformation played in the crisis.

​

Recommendation 11: Following crises, the government, led by the central directorate/Cabinet Office and working with relevant partners, including LRFs, should consistently undertake a review of the role that misinformation and disinformation played in the crisis.